As an interesting application on cloud computing, content-based image retrieval (CBIR) has attracted a lot of attention, but the focus of previous research work was mainly on improving the retrieval performance rather than addressing security issues such as copyrights and user privacy. With an increase of security attacks in the computer networks, these security issues become critical for CBIR systems. In this paper, we propose a novel two-party watermarking protocol that can resolve the issues regarding user rights and privacy. Unlike the previously published protocols, our protocol does not require the existence of a trusted party. It exhibits three useful features: security against partial watermark removal, security in watermark verification and non-repudiation. In addition, we report an empirical research of CBIR with the security mechanism. The experimental results show that the proposed protocol is practicable and the retrieval performance will not be affected by watermarking query images.
INTRODUCTION
Content-based image retrieval (CBIR) is an interesting application that can be implemented more effectively on cloud computing. CBIR aims to search digital images from large image data sets based on their visual content described by features such as color, texture and shape [1, 2] . On cloud computing [3, 4] , CBIR systems can serve more effectively by saving the computation time of image analysis and searching. The high performance and flexibility of cloud computing can also benefit the deployment of CBIR systems.
Improving the retrieval performance in CBIR has attracted a lot of attention, while very few efforts address security concerns. As examples, we found that Fleck et al. [5] demonstrated a content-based retrieval strategy to tell whether there are naked people present in an image, and Li [6] proposed a security mechanism for CBIR in which hierarchical queries with different authorizations on a large image collection are implemented based on digital watermarks. With the popularity of CBIR in ordinary users and the increase of security attacks in the computer networks, the security in CBIR is becoming more and more important.
We found that conventional CBIR systems suffer from the user right problem, where under query-by-example paradigm, a dishonest service provider of CBIR can distribute the user's query image without authorization, while the query image may include the user's private information or copyright. For instance, in medical applications, a medical image is used as a query [7] , which includes that the user's health information should not be distributed without authorization. An artist may use an unpublished artwork as a query to search similar images, but the unauthorized copies of the query image are forbidden. Obviously, the user right problem in such situations should be taken into account.
Our research work shows that the user's privacy can be protected by conventional copy deterrence schemes based on digital watermarking. In the context of CBIR, the user (owner of a query image) inserts a unique watermark into a query image before it is sent to a service provider of CBIR. If the service provider distributes unauthorized copies of the watermarked image, then these copies can be traced to the unlawful distributor (original service provider of CBIR) using a watermark detection algorithm [8] . An important advantage of this approach is that 2 J. Zhang et al. it is independent of the image retrieval techniques; namely, this approach can be applied in various CBIR systems to protect the user right.
However, it has been shown that such a copy deterrence scheme suffers from a number of security problems, such as the user right problem [9, 10] and the unbinding problem [11] . Therefore, a number of buyer-seller watermarking protocols have been proposed to provide secure copy deterrence, which will be reviewed in Section 2. In the context of CBIR, these security problems have not been explored sufficiently. This paper has two major contributions. First, we present a novel watermarking protocol for user rights and privacy protection in the context of CBIR. Secondly, an empirical research is reported to show that image retrieval with the security mechanism is effective. Specifically, our work can meet the following new research challenges.
(1) First, the participants and their roles in an imageretrieval watermarking protocol are different from those in a buyer-seller watermarking protocol. In a buyerseller watermarking protocol, the seller is the owner of a digital content, who conducts the watermark insertion, and the buyer can obtain a watermarked digital content. In contrast, in an image-retrieval watermarking protocol, the user is the owner of a query image, who should insert a watermark to protect its right, and the service provider of CBIR will search images according to the watermarked query image obtained from the user. The difference makes some existing security solutions inapplicable; e.g. the solution of the unbinding problem for a buyer-seller watermarking protocol [11] is inapplicable in an image-retrieval watermarking protocol. We will explain it in Section 3. (2) Second, a new watermarking protocol should be easily embedded in real-world image retrieval systems. It should require a direct interaction between the user and the service provider. In the previous work [12] , a three-party protocol was proposed to solve the user right problem in CBIR systems. However, that protocol is based on a trusted third party, WCA, and the user needs to contact WCA for requesting a watermark, which is against the user's habits in CBIR and will hinder the applications of CBIR. In this paper, a novel two-party watermarking protocol is proposed to overcome this shortcoming. The proposed protocol provides a higher security level by solving the problems that were not considered in the previous work. (3) Third, different watermarking protocols have different requirements to balance the quality of watermarked digital content and the robustness of digital watermark. It is a hard problem behind buyer-seller watermarking protocols, since the customer requires high-quality digital content, which conflicts with the the robustness of digital watermark. However, this problem is not serious in the CBIR systems, because the user cares about the retrieval performance instead of the quality of watermarked query image. In this paper, a novel research on content-based image retrieval of watermarked query images is reported to show that it is possible to improve the robustness of digital watermark by reducing the quality of watermarked query images without influencing retrieval performance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related work, buyer-seller watermarking protocols. In Section 3, the design goals of our image-retrieval watermarking protocol are outlined; Section 4 presents a novel two-party watermarking protocol whose security is discussed in Section 5. In Section 7, an empirical research on secure image retrieval is reported. Finally, Section 8 concludes this paper.
RELATED WORK
Since our image retrieval protocol uses the buyer-seller watermarking protocol as its basis, we present a review on it. According to whether a trusted third party (WCA or WGA) takes part in creating and validating digital watermarks, existing watermarking protocols can be classified into two categories: three-party and two-party watermarking protocols.
Three-party watermarking protocols are based on a trusted third party (WCA or WGA). Memon and Wong proposed a three-party watermarking protocol [10] to solve the customer's right problem [9] , assuming that a malicious seller is able to frame an honest buyer in traditional copy deterrence schemes. The proposed protocol is based on homomorphic encryption schemes, in which WCA is introduced to provide valid watermarks. In [13] , Ju et al. improved Memon and Wong's protocol by providing an anonymity mechanism for the customer based on anonymous keys. Lei et al. pointed out that Memon and Wong's protocol suffers from the unbinding problem [11] ; that is, the seller can transplant the watermark embedded in a pirated copy into a copy of higher-priced digital content. They solved the unbinding problem by binding a watermark to a common agreement (ARG) by a WCA's signature. Zhang et al. [14] identified and solved the secure verification problem in previous watermarking protocols. That is, an arbitrator is able to remove an original watermark from an unauthorized copy of the digital content and resell multiple copies of it with impunity. In [15] , Frattolillo proposed and implemented a web-oriented and anonymous watermarking protocol to solve both the customer's right problem and the unbinding problem. Considering heavy computation and bandwidth required by a homomorphic public-key cipher, Katzenbeisser et al. [16] proposed a watermarking protocol based on WGA, utilizing secure embedding algorithms and a symmetric encryption scheme. Thomas et al. [17] proposed a joint watermarking scheme and protocol for multiparty Secure Image Retrieval 3 multilevel DRM architecture involving several levels of distributions between an owner and a consumer. Two-party watermarking protocols automatically create a valid digital watermark without such a trusted third party (WCA or WGA). These protocols can avoid the conspiracy problem, i.e. the seller (or the buyer) may collude with WCA (or WGA) to cheat the innocent buyer (or seller) [18, 19] . Kuribayashi and Tanaka proposed and implemented a two-party fingerprinting scheme that embeds an information bit in the encrypted domain that ensures the plain value is not exposed [20] . However, the scheme suffers from the unbinding problem and the use of zeroknowledge proofs significantly impedes its practicability. To avoid the conspiracy problem, Zhang et al. proposed a twoparty watermarking protocol based on the idea of sharing a secret between the seller and the buyer, which can resolve the customer's right problem, the unbinding problem and the anonymity problem simultaneously [19] . Ibrahim et al. also proposed a watermarking protocol to solve the conspiracy problem based on the trusted certification authority (CA), in which CA needs to access the watermark [21] . One drawback in [19] is that the arbitration process needs the assistance of the buyer, namely the dispute problem. To solve this problem, Deng and Preneel proposed an improved two-party watermarking protocol by incorporating secure group signature schemes [22] . In their protocol, the arbitration process needs the assistance of a group manager. Recently, Phan et al. presented an attack [23] on the two-party watermarking protocol [19] ; that is, the buyer can remove its part of the watermark from the watermarked digital content. We will show how this attack can be avoided.
DESIGN GOALS
We consider that a two-party image-retrieval watermarking protocol should solve the following problems.
(1) The user right problem. This problem has two aspects. On the one hand, the service provider of CBIR may distribute the user's private query image without authentication. On the other hand, the user may frame a service provider. (2) The unbinding problem. In the context of CBIR, it means that the user may transplant the watermark embedded in a pirated copy into a copy of higher-priced query image. (3) The anonymity of users. In CBIR, an ordinary user may not have any identifications and the anonymity of the user should be retained during the whole image retrieval session. (4) Partial watermark removement. In the context of CBIR, this attack means that the service provider may remove its part of watermark, so as to defeat the user right protection. (5) Secure verification problem. An arbitrator is able to remove an original watermark from an unauthorized copy and resell multiple copies of it with impunity.
(6) The dispute problem. In the arbitration stage, an arbitrator must be able to make judgment without the assistance of the service provider of CBIR.
Based on the review in Section 2, three problems have not been solved in existing two-party buyer-seller watermarking protocols, which are the problems of partial watermarking removement, secure verification problem and the dispute problem. In addition, it must be pointed out that the solution of the unbinding problem [11] is inapplicable in an image-retrieval watermarking protocol. The reason is that the service provider in an image-retrieval watermarking protocol is different from the seller in a buyer-seller watermarking protocol. The seller, as the owner of the digital content, can create an ARG, including a description of digital content beforehand, which is necessary in the solution of the unbinding problem [11] . However, the service provider is not the owner of a query image and cannot create an ARG, including a description of the query image beforehand, which makes the existing solution in [11] inapplicable. Therefore, it would be a big challenge for a secure image-retrieval watermarking protocol to solve all six problems simultaneously.
PROPOSED WATERMARKING PROTOCOL
The proposed two-party image-retrieval watermarking protocol consists of two sub-protocols: protection protocol and arbitration protocol. In contrast to the protocol in [12] , the proposed protocol does not need the assistance of WCA, which is more applicable and effective for practical CBIR applications.
Introduction of crypto primitives
The proposed protocol is based on several crypto primitives: encryption and homomorphic encryption, signature and perceptual hash. This section provide a brief introduction of those primitives for readers without the background knowledge. For basic and depth information, the reader can refer to [24] .
Encryption is designed to protect the confidentiality of messages by transforming plaintext using a scheme to ciphertext that is readable only by people who possess a special key. Encryption schemes include the conventional (or symmetric) schemes and public-key (or asymmetric) schemes. In contrast to conventional symmetric schemes, asymmetric schemes use a public key for encryption and a different private key for decryption [24] . With the plaintext x and the public key pk as input, the ciphertext y can be produced by
where E denotes the encryption algorithm. With the ciphertext y and the private key sk as input, the plaintext x can be produced by where D denotes the decryption algorithm. RSA [25] is a most prominent example for asymmetric encryption. An homomorphic encryption scheme has the property that the ciphertext of two combined plaintexts using some operators can be directly computed from two ciphertexts of the individual plaintexts using some operators without any intermediate decryption [24, 26] . For any given encryption key, the encryption algorithm E of some homomorphic encryption schemes satisfies
Homomorphic can be additively homomorphic or multiplicatively homomorphic, which consider addition operators or multiplication operators, respectively. An important application of public key encryption is digital signature [24] . A basic idea is that the sender, A, prepares a message x and signs it by encrypting x using the sender's private key before transmission. The receiver, B, can decrypt the message using the sender's public key. Because the message x was encrypted using the sender's private key, only the sender could have prepared it. Therefore, the entire encrypted message serves as a digital signature. Normally, the practical digital signature schemes are more complex and effective. Digital signature can be used for authentication, integrity check and also provide non-repudiation. In this paper, Sign A (x) denotes a digital signature signed by A on the message x.
A perceptual hash can be considered as a fingerprint of a target multimedia, which is derived from various features of the multimedia content. In this paper, we talk only about images, although the proposed protocol can also be applied for other types of multimedia. Unlike cryptographic hash functions, which are extremely sensitive to the input message, an image hash function takes into account changes in the visual domain [27, 28] because digital images may undergo various manipulations such as compression and enhancement. Image hash can be used for image identification. A pair of images, X 1 and X 2 , are perceptual identical images if
where H (X 1 ) and H (X 2 ) denote the perceptual hash vectors of two images, f h (·, ·) is a function to compute the distance between two hash vectors and τ is a threshold. Different applications may have different security requirements on the perceptual hash. Considering the scenarios of content authentication and auti-piracy search, a perceptual hash would have three desirable properties: perceptual robustness, fragility to visually distinct images and unpredictability of the hash [28] .
Protection protocol
In the protection protocol, the interaction occurs between the user (U) and the service provider of CBIR (SP). Figure 1 visualizes the details of the following steps.
( Finally, if both parties are honest, U can receive retrieval results and this image retrieval session is completed.
Arbitration protocol
The arbitration protocol is designed to trace the pirate responsible and gather undeniable evidence, when an unauthorized copy Y of the user's query image X is found. The proposed arbitration protocol consists of two stages. In the first stage, U identifies the dishonest SP and collects undeniable evidence. In the second stage, an arbitrator (ARB) makes a judgment based on the evidence provided by U. U can identify the dishonest SP by checking the information associated with the SPs. Note that, in [12] , U is allowed to contact only one SP. However, the proposed two-party protocol allows U to contact multiple SPs for requesting retrieval results. For each SP, U first collects the relevant information, Cert SP (pk SP ), pk, Sign SP 
, this SP is the dishonest SP. The identification method is based on the fact that RSA encryption is a deterministic encryption algorithm [25] . In case the dishonest SP is found, U sends the evidence information, Cert SP (pk SP ), pk, Sign SP (pk), ARG, H (X), E pk (W SP ), Sign SP (ARG, H (X), E pk (W SP )) and W SP to ARB.
Upon receiving these data, ARB verifies the validity of the signatures. If any of them is invalid, he rejects the case. Otherwise, ARB computes E pk (W SP ). If E pk (W SP ) = E pk (W SP ), ARB turns to the CA and asks for the real identity behind pk SP . Once the identity of an SP who owns pk SP is revealed, ARB charges the SP and closes the case. If E pk (W SP ) = E pk (W SP ), ARB cancels this arbitration request.
The proposed secure watermarking protocol consisting of protection and arbitration sub-protocols can meet all design goals such as user right, unbinding, anonymity of users, partial watermark removal, secure verification and dispute. The next section provides a security analysis in detail.
SECURITY ANALYSIS
This section shows how the proposed image-retrieval watermarking protocol can achieve the design goals outlined in Section 3 by examining the security problems. It follows the approach of security analysis adopted in the research of conventional buyer-seller watermarking protocols [9] [10] [11] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] .
(1) The user right problem. The proposed protocol provides a pirate tracing mechanism, which can discourage the unauthorized distribution, so as to achieve the user's right protection. On the one hand, an SP is unable to remove the watermark W since it has only the watermarked query imageX without the knowledge of the original image X, the watermark W and information of watermarking locations I wl . Once an unauthorized copy Y created by an SP is found, U is able to identify the SP and collect enough evidence to prove that Y is distributed by the SP without authorization. On the other hand, U is unable to fabricate piracy to frame an SP since the watermark insertion is performed in encrypted domain and U has no knowledge of the watermark W and the watermarked query imageX. (2) The unbinding problem. The proposed protocol solved this problem in a novel way, which includes two steps conducted by SP. First, SP creates the signature Sign SP (ARG, H (X), E pk (W SP )), which explicitly binds ARG, X and W SP . Second, SP verifies f h (H (X), H (X)) < τ , which assures that the signature is associated with the query image. Therefore, it is impossible for U to transplant a watermark into a copy of another higher-priced image. Note that, in the image retrieval protocol, ARG cannot include the information of the query image X, because SP has no knowledge of X before U starts up the image retrieval protocol. In addition, the one-time key pair can be used to prevent U to fool SP by using outdated information [11] . If U tries to send SP a watermarked copy encrypted with a wrong key, SP hardly gets any meaningful result from decryption. (3) The anonymity of users. The proposed image retrieval protocol allows U to keep anonymity without any identification, such as digital certificate issued by CA. Actually, the identification of SP is necessary. In the protection protocol, no information on the identification of U is necessary. In the arbitration protocol, U (6) The dispute problem. In the proposed arbitration protocol, ARB is able to make a judgment solely based on the evidence provided by U without the assistance of SP. If an SP is guilty, ARB will turn to the CA and asks for the SP real identity. If an SP is judged to be innocent, its identity will not be revealed. Table 1 compares the proposed protocol and other five watermarking protocols and shows the proposed protocol is more secure and effective. The proposed two-party watermarking protocol outperforms the three-party protocol [12] . First, ordinary users in CBIR are used to solely interact with service provider for image retrieval request. The trusted third-party (WCA) introduced in the three-party protocol [12] may hinder the practical applications of CBIR, while the proposed two-party protocol can well match ordinary users' habits. Second, the proposed two-party protocol can solve the secure verification problem, which is not considered in the previous three-party protocol. Actually, no existing twoparty watermarking protocol can solve the secure verification problem. Third, the proposed protocol provides a more effective arbitration mechanism, in which ARB is able to make judgment based solely on the evidence provided by the user without any other assistances. The solution outperforms the groupsignature-based solution for the dispute problem [22] , which needs the assistance of group manager.
DISCUSSIONS
This section provides some discussions on our secure watermarking protocol for CBIR systems. They are related to the quality of watermarked digital content, the disadvantages of using the proposed protocol and denial of service (DoS) attacks.
How to control the quality of watermarked digital content is a critical problem in conventional buyer-seller watermarking protocols. The high-quality digital content is the customer's basic requirement, while the robustness of digital watermark conflicts with the quality of watermarked digital content. In this paper, we present two reasons to show that this problem is not serious in the proposed protocol for CBIR. First, CBIR is to search similar images; so it is not so sensitive to the quality of watermarked query image. A novel empirical research is reported in Section 7 to support this argument. Second, since U and SP have no conflict of interest in CBIR, they can cooperate to control the quality of watermarked query image; so it will not affect the retrieval performance. On the one hand, U would like to control well the quality of watermarked query image because it intends to obtain good retrieval results. On the other hand, SP would also like to control well the quality of watermarked query image because it intends to provide good retrieval service and attracts more users.
The proposed watermarking protocol combines the digital watermarking techniques and the traditional cryptography 
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Deng and Zhang and Wong [10] Lei et al. techniques to protect the rights of user and service provider in the context of CBIR. The advantages have been shown in Table 1 by comparing the properties of the proposed two-party protocol with previous three-party and two-party protocols. The disadvantages of using the proposed protocol may be twofold. First, the image retrieval speed will be affected due to the protection protocol performed between the user and service provider. Second, the user and the service provider should have sufficient computational resources for encryption and decryption. Therefore, as mentioned in Section 1, the proposed protocol is designed for the situations where security concerns are critical, such as medical image retrieval. A DoS attack is a critical problem in network and system security, which aims to deny access by legitimate users to shared services or resources [30] . Existing DoS attack defense proposals [31] can be incorporated into our secure watermarking protocol, although it is proposed to protect the user's privacy. For example, since the service of CBIR is designed for use by a person, it is reasonable to filter all requests generated by an automated source, such as an attack 'zombie'. Before using a service, a suspicious user can be asked to complete an admission challenge that requires human judgment, such as reading a character string presented as an image [32] . We can also use IP traceback schemes [33] to trace the attack sources by active interaction.
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON SECURE IMAGE RETRIEVAL
This section reports an empirical research on CBIR with the proposed security mechanism. First, we provide an implementation of image retrieval scheme with the user's privacy protection. Then, a number of retrieval experiments are carried out on a Corel image data set [34] to demonstrate the practicality and effectiveness of the proposed scheme. Figure 2 shows some example images in the Corel data set.
Image retrieval scheme
A new image retrieval scheme is implemented, which consists of two stages: watermarking query images and retrieval with watermarked query images. Figure 3 illustrates our scheme for secure image retrieval.
Watermarking in encrypted domain
In the first stage, U inserts a digital watermark into its query image in the encrypted domain, which is achieved through the proposed protection protocol. A color image X is provided as a query, and a spread-spectrum watermarking technique proposed by Cox et al. [35] is used for robust watermark insertion. The color image X is first converted into a YIQ representation and the brightness component is then watermarked. Specifically, we take the two-dimensional DCT of the brightness component and a watermark in terms of a set of independent real number W = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w m } drawn from N(0, 1) is inserted into the largest m AC coefficients {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m } by an insertion formula to yield modified coefficients {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m }. The insertion formula is
where α is a scaling parameter. The results reported using m = 1000 and α = 0.1 show that the technique is remarkably robust against various image-processing operations without influencing image quality [8] . To determine whether a given image contains a watermark, the decoder extracts the data from the image by taking the largest m DCT AC coefficient and subtracting their values from x i . The earlier-mentioned watermarking technique and the wellknown RSA public key system can be combined to provide an implementation of the proposed watermarking protocol described in the previous section. The RSA cryptosystem operates in Z n , where n is a product of two very large primes. A message x is then encrypted as
where pk is the public key and the corresponding description function is
where sk is the private key. In the proposed image-retrieval watermarking protocol, the watermark W for insertion is composed of the U's watermark W U and SP's watermark W SP . We assume that both W U and W SP consists of m independent random samples drawn from N(1, α). Since the RSA cryptosystem has the property that
We have
Specifically, . Furthermore, U can insert the watermark W into the query X in the encrypted domain, which is as follows:
E pk (X) is sent to SP for the purpose of image retrieval.
Retrieval with watermarked query image
In the second stage, SP obtains the watermarked query imageX by decrypting E pk (X) and retrieves similar images by ranking the images in the Corel data set according to their similarities toX. We use four MPEG-7 visual descriptors [36, 37] to describe the visual content of images, and image similarities are measured by feature distances,
where FX and F I are the representations of imagesX and I in a feature space, and D(·, ·) is a specific distance metric used in the feature space. The selected MPEG-7 visual descriptors include the color structure descriptor (CSD), color layout descriptor (CLD), edge histogram descriptor (EHD) and homogeneous texture descriptor (HTD). The recommended distance metrics by MPEG-7 are used to compute feature distances on corresponding visual descriptors. The MPEG-7 standards provide a recommended distance metric for each visual descriptor based on the core experiments [37] . In other words, the recommended metrics are good choice to match feature distances and visual similarity. A short summary on visual descriptors and recommended distance metrics is provided in this section.
CSD provides information regarding color distribution as well as localized spatial color structure in the image. The image is represented by a modified color histogram. The distance between two CSD histograms for two images is calculated using L 1 -norm metric as follows:
where H X,i and H Y,i represent the ith bin of the color structure histograms for two images, respectively. DCD compactly conveys global information regarding the dominant colors present in the image. An image is represented as a set of color vectors, c i , together with their percentages, p i . The recommended distance measure applied for DCD is
. a k,l denotes the similarity coefficient between c k and c l , which is calculated as
In Equation (15) 
where w i represents the weight associated with ith coefficient. EHD captures the edge distribution within an image. The image similarity based on EHD descriptors is determined by calculating the L 1 -norm of the 80-dimensional feature vectors H X and H Y ,
HTD characterizes the mean and energy deviation of 30 frequency channels modeled by Gabor functions. The distance between two vectors T X and T Y is calculated as
where α(k) was determined experimentally. Using different visual features to represent image content will lead to different image retrieval results. This can be demonstrated by the precision-recall curves for different visual features when α = 0 in Fig. 6 , although this figure is aimed to show the effect of watermarking query image to image retrieval performance. α = 0 means no watermark is inserted into the query image. For example, the retrieval performance of using CSD is better than HTD since the precision of using CSD is always higher than using HTD at each recall when α = 0 in Fig. 6. 
Performance evaluation
Three sets of experiments are carried out to evaluate the proposed scheme. The first one is on the robustness of digital watermark with variable watermarking strength. The second one is on the effect of watermarking to perceptual image hashing. The third one is on the retrieval performance using watermarked query images. 
Results of digital watermarking
The robustness of digital watermark can be improved by carefully increasing the strength of watermarking. Our experiments aim to confirm it. In the experiments, the JPEG attack is applied to evaluate the robustness of digital watermark. Figure 4a and b show the average response of detector on a number of watermarked query images with variable α. The qualities of JPEG compression are set as 5 and 10%, respectively. When α increases from 0.1 to 0.4, the average response of detector increases about 10 in both figures, that is very significant. However, we cannot increase α without limit. In both figures, the average response of a detector increases first then decreases. When α > 1, the watermarking operation may lost its meaning because the amount of digital watermark is more than the host image. More importantly, with a large α the operation of watermark insertion in the DCT domain, as shown in Equation (5), may not work well in the experiments because many pixel values of the watermarked image directly created from the modified DCT coefficients may be over the field of definitions, [0, 255]. To avoid possible distortions, we change the pixel values out of the definition filed into 0 or 255 in the experiments. Due to this reason, some watermarks cannot be effectively extracted later. Based on this observation, we can think about to improve the robustness of digital watermark by selecting α in the area of [0.1, 0.8]. The price is that the fidelity of watermarked query images decreases quickly, as shown in Fig. 4c . For example, the SNR (signal-noise-rate) decreases from 29 to 17 when α increases from 0.1 to 0.4. Further research on digital watermarking techniques for CBIR is left for future work.
Results of perceptual image hashing
The experiments aim to explore whether watermarking query images affect the perceptual image hashing. Ten query images are randomly selected from the data set and watermarked with variable α. The feature-point-based image hashing [28] is 
Results of image retrieval
The experiments aim to explore whether and how the perceptual quality of watermarked query images influence the image retrieval performance. In the experiments, we change the perceptual quality of a watermarked query imageX by modifying m and α. Two sets of experiments are carried out using variable α and m, respectively. The retrieval performance in terms of precision and recall [38] is reported. Precision is defined as the number of relevant images retrieved divided by the total number of images retrieved. Recall is defined as the number of relevant images retrieved divided by the total number of existing relevant images. Figure 6 shows the image retrieval performance when the query images are watermarked using m = 1000 and variable α. In particular, α = 0 means the query images are original without watermarking. According to the experimental results, the performances of image retrieval using CSD, CLD and HTD descriptors are nearly not affected when α increases from 0 to 0.8. Even though the parameter α can affect the performance of image retrieval using EHD descriptor, the retrieval performance decreases slightly when α = 0.2. As reported by Cox et al. [35] that the watermarking technique using α = 0.1 is remarkably robust against many image-processing operations, using α = 0.2 can provide a practical level of robustness for CBIR. Figure 7 shows the image retrieval performance when the query images are watermarked using variable m and α = 0.2. In particular, m = 0 means the query images are original without watermarking. When m increase from 0 to 5000, the performances of image retrieval using CSD, CLD and HTD descriptors nearly do not change. In the case of EHD descriptor, the change of retrieval performance is very little. At any recall point, the change of corresponding precision is about 3%. The robustness of image retrieval using watermarked query images can be acceptable in practice. Figure 8 shows an example of original query image and watermarked query image. Obviously, the quality of watermarked query images is low. Therefore, a low-quality query image has no significant effect to the image retrieval performance in our experiments. It is possible to improve the robustness of digital watermarks by reducing the quality of watermarked query images without influencing the image retrieval performance. Further research is left for future work. Actually, the motivation could also be reduced for the service provider to distribute a low-quality watermarked query image without authorization.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a new two-party image-retrieval watermarking protocol, which can address six problems: the user right problem, the unbinding problem, the anonymity of users, partial watermark removal, secure verification problem and the dispute problem. The proposed protocol outperforms the existing three-parity protocol due to its feasibility and security. We also empirically researched CBIR with watermarked query images. The experimental results show that watermarking query images do not affect the retrieval performance; so the robustness of digital watermark can be improved by increasing its strength.
In the future work, we will develop new watermarking and retrieval algorithms to enhance the robustness of digital watermark at the cost of low-quality watermarked query image without influencing the retrieval performance. This paper investigated the influence of watermarking query images to image retrieval scheme using single visual feature. An interesting future work is to explore the influence of watermarking query images to image retrieval schemes using multiple visual features.
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